BECHER & ZARSKY

2/15/2011

OPEN DOORS, TRAP DOORS, AND THE
LAW
SHMUEL I. BECHER*
TAL Z. ZARSKY**
I
INTRODUCTION
Common wisdom teaches us to strive to leave as many options open for as
long as possible. We are advised by mentors and peers to constantly re-examine
decisions and offers, seek out new ones, and keep sight and control of the old.
The general preference to keep all doors open is ubiquitous and exercised in
various walks of life. Keeping doors open is a cultural phenomenon that has
become part of the unique American experience.
Leaving doors open is not merely a business or social dynamic. It is also
reflected and rooted in the law in various ways, and can be articulated in
legalistic terminology. The phenomenon of the open door is relevant to a
variety of legal facets. This article focuses on open doors in the context of
consumer contract law. Accordingly, the term “open door” will be used to refer
to situations in which an individual can exercise, ex post, a right to rescind or
withdraw from (and thus reverse) an ex ante commitment or decision.1 More
specifically, within the realm of contract theory, this article focuses on
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1. In recent years, interest has grown in the way people make decisions, and its influence, among
other things, on well-being and happiness. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005). A few
popular books, based on extensive academic research, address issues raised in this article, though not in
detail, nor from a legal perspective. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); BARRY
SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004).
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implications for contract formation interpretation and the design of contractual
default rules.
A key example of the abstract notion of the open door in actual business
practices is that of return policies. In general, liberal return policies are typical
in many consumer markets.2 Put simply, when a consumer is granted (at the
time of the transaction) a right to return a product to the seller and get her
money back “no questions asked,” she is entitled to an open door.3 In such a
case, the original decision—to enter a transaction and purchase an item—can be
reversed. This example is discussed throughout the paper.
On the face of it, leaving doors open makes perfect sense. Firms offering
such opportunities should be encouraged and commended. Why shouldn’t we
put off decision-making as long as possible while leaving all options open?
After all, this reflects the general human tendency to procrastinate,4 and seems
to have inherent value as well. In the meantime, another, better option could
materialize or come to our attention, or new information may surface. Given
the variety of options, the complexity of markets, and the sophisticated tastes of
individuals, any extra time to contemplate a decision or transaction at stake
must surely be a blessing.5
Contrary to this line of reasoning, open doors are often not a blessing, but a
curse in disguise. In many instances, keeping doors open might not be the
optimal strategy to assure wealth maximization and happiness. Moreover, at
times, an open door may be part of a carefully tailored strategy to manipulate
individuals—to enter transactions they should avoid.
The benefits associated with open doors and the conventional wisdom that
promotes the notion of leaving doors open are detailed in part II. There are
three basic ways in which the law can react to (or endorse) this phenomenon.
First, it can impose open doors. For example, the law can provide mandatory
cooling-off periods in which a party to a transaction can withdraw from it.
Second, the law can encourage open doors by, for instance, formulating default
2. Lenient return policies and similar practices are part of a broader movement of generating trust
and confidence in mass retail. These latter forms of commerce were an important shift in the United
States, away from small, local shops (that at times discriminated among consumers). See JOSEPH
TUROW, NICHE ENVY: MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 31 (2006).
3. Similarly, a borrower’s ability, after commencing a financial loan (such as a home equity loan),
to refinance, pay, or substantially change its terms without penalty might also be referred to as an
“open door.” Such rights are popular in U.S. loan markets, and are even mandated in several states. See
Peter J. Wallison, Cause and Effect: Government Policies and the Financial Crisis, FIN. SERVS.
OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research), Nov. 2008, at 6–7. The issue of whether
refinancing resembles an open door or the formulation of a new agreement is beyond the scope of this
article.
4. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1675 n.141 (2006) (providing various sources that
support this assertion).
5. A recent working paper explains that in many instances, recognizing open door rights leads to
efficient outcomes. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Eric Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract
Law (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 514, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569753.

BECHER & ZARKSY

Spring 2011]

2/15/2011

OPEN DOORS, TRAP DOORS, AND THE LAW

65

rules that call for open doors. Third, the law can allow the open door.6 Here, the
law will simply respect parties’ decisions to opt for open doors and uphold their
preferences. These three basic legal responses are detailed in part III.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, keeping doors open has its own pitfalls.
Unfortunately, policymakers—not unlike the general population—tend to
neglect the negative aspects of leaving doors open. This will be demonstrated in
part IV, where the complex and rather counterintuitive consequences of the
law’s tendency to allow, uphold, or encourage open doors are considered.
The desire to leave doors open has far-reaching, diverse, and, at times,
contradictory psychological, economic, and legal implications. In many cases,
people assume that doors remain open for use at a later time when this is not, in
fact, the case. Therefore, people’s reliance on the open door may lead to
inefficient outcomes. This leads people to insist on getting an open door (and
compensating the opposing party for it) although they seldom use it. Moreover,
this leads people to engage in transactions they should rationally avoid, or to
purchase products they need not buy.
The problems associated with open doors call for a broad array of responses
which must be inspected carefully. Initial recommendations for research are
delineated in part V. However, the notions presented are merely a first step in
understanding the impact of psychological phenomena on contract law and
consumer protection policy.
II
THE INTUITIVE AND ANALYTICAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF OPEN DOORS
In order to better understand the phenomenon of open doors and to
consider the appropriate legal response to this practice, it is necessary to
consider its benefits. Thus, the various benefits commonly associated with the
notion of leaving doors open are addressed in this part. We set out four basic
arguments. The first pertains to information gathering; the second to managing
(or limiting) risk; the third to psychological well-being; and the fourth to
positive externalities.7
A. Open Doors and Information Gathering
One of the most basic assumptions of efficient markets is that sufficient
information exists for all parties involved in a transaction.8 In theory, rational

6. A fourth response—the law barring voluntary open door provisions and practices—is also
possible. However, in view of the many advantages of such provisions as well as other policy
considerations (such as avoiding paternalism), such a response seems extremely unlikely.
7. Insofar as our analysis draws clear distinctions among these different aspects, it is mainly for
reasons of methodology and clarity. We are well aware that these benefits at times overlap and interact.
8. Human participants are expected to behave in ways that “(1) maximize their utility (2) from a
stable set of preferences and (3) accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a
variety of markets.” GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)
(numerals inserted).
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market participants have the knowledge and understanding of all the attributes
of the transaction they engage in. They are well versed in all elements
pertaining to competing products or services. They also possess the required
attention span to decide among them. This range of knowledge allows market
participants to properly select and price a transaction. In doing so they might
employ a “weighted adding strategy,” which requires a thorough analysis of the
options at stake, including all their pertinent attributes.9
Clearly, such a setting virtually never materializes. Typically, parties lack
sufficient information, or time and attention to gather, analyze, and digest it.
This, in itself, is a solvable problem. In theory, parties might apply various
decision-making mechanisms to work through the complex datasets they
encounter,10 while using the time and attention they can spare to “satisfice.”11
Moreover, parties might often blunder, but their errors will offset one another
so the overall outcome might still be efficient and fair.12
However, outcomes are not often efficient and fair. In many transactions,
unsophisticated, one-shot players (such as consumers)13 systematically lack
sufficient information and resources. At the same time, sophisticated, repeat
players (such as retailers) benefit from superior information—conspicuously in
instances when they dictate the contractual framework and terms. In such cases,
if the consumers’ errors are in the same direction, legal intervention might be
justified.

9. This strategy is discussed in many different decision-making contexts. See, e.g., James R.
Bettman, Mary Frances Luce & John W. Payne, Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J.
CONSUMER RES. 187 (1998) (applying this strategy in the context of consumers). According to this
strategy, a consumer assigns a weight to every attribute she wishes to compare. Important features
receive relatively high weight while less significant attributes are given less weight. The consumer
presumably scores each product characteristic. Finally, the consumer multiplies the weight and the
given score, then adds all factors for one total score. This score will represent the product’s overall
quality from the consumer’s viewpoint. A consumer who seeks to maximize utility chooses the product
that received the highest total score.
10. Gerd Gigerenzer, Why Heuristics Work, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 20, 20 (2008) (naming
logic, probability, and heuristics as three modes in which humans make decisions).
11. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV.
129, 129 (1956) (noting that when making decisions, “organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do
not, in general, ‘optimize’”). Simon also coined the term “bounded rationality” to refer to human’s
computational limitations and definite ability. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND
RATIONAL 198 (1957). For an illuminating discussion in the context of consumer decision-making and
information overload, see David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
13. Indeed, consumers themselves are repeat players in the sense that they engage in repeated
transactions, at times even with the same vendor. However, as a class they lack sophistication,
resources, and experience for the following reasons: First, even though consumers engage in many
transactions, vendors engage in far more. Second, vendors have the ability, motivation, and knowledge
to use information that transactions generate to learn a great deal about the transaction and the
transacting party—something most consumers are unable to do. Third, vendors are able to structure the
transaction based on the knowledge and insights they gather—architecturally, legally, and financially.
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Considering this background, open doors provide consumers with more time
to reflect on the pros and cons of a transaction.14 This time allows for
examination of additional, competing options. And as time passes, new options
may emerge or be discovered. This benefits consumers who are not familiar
with the options that markets offer, or might offer in the near future. In
addition, during this time, more information (negative or positive) might
become available from third parties.
Moreover, open doors provide parties with additional opportunities to learn
about the product they have purchased, as they allow consumers to experience
the product.15 A classic example would be a distance-selling transaction (by
phone or the Internet) involving tangible products, accompanied by a lenient
return policy.16 Typically, in distance selling, the consumer has not had a chance
to interact directly with the product prior to purchase. By using the product, the
consumer can ascertain its attributes and whether it truly suits her preferences
and needs.
To a lesser degree, similar logic applies to all sales of tangibles. Prior to a
transaction, consumers can learn of a product’s attributes by reading about the
product and examining it at the store. But the experience of using a product in
the comfort of their home (where the pressures of sales representatives are
absent) allows consumers to quickly and easily learn a great deal about the
product.
Of course, learning through experience is not limited to tangibles. A similar
dynamic might transpire with intangible assets as well. Consider a newspaper
subscription, a cell phone service, or any other service that comes at a set price.
Ex ante, consumers typically believe they will be able to afford the service
without financial hardship. However, after some time, consumers might learn
that they have committed themselves to a demanding payment schedule that is
beyond their means. If consumers have an open door, they can rescind their
contract and enter a new one that accommodates their economic circumstances.
Living through the contractual terms assists individuals in understanding the
“true” meaning, implications, and complications of a transaction.
Rather than outward, extra time allows a party to look inward. Time allows
a purchaser to better understand her preferences, financial situation, and
personal taste—whether through further investigating, or experiencing a
product or service.

14. Open doors can assist consumers in learning how products fit in their home or with other
products. See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 20.
15. This is often the case because the purchaser has the actual possession. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar &
Posner, supra note 5, at 15 (referring, for example, to musical equipment).
16. Interestingly, some legislatures outside the United States provide consumers with a mandatory
right to cancel a long-distance selling transaction. See Georg Borges & Bernd Irlenbusch, Fairness
Crowded out by Law: An Experimental Study on Withdrawal Rights, 163 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 84, 85–86 (2007) (comparing general EU rules on consumer withdrawal rights with policies of
members states).
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B. Open Doors and the Allocation of Risk
Information gathering is merely one aspect of open doors. Additionally,
open doors assist in allocating risks among parties. If a consumer wishes to
maximize her utility through open market transactions, she must accurately
assess the risks involved. In consumer markets, there are various forms of risk
(for instance, that a product’s value will fall, or that circumstances will change,
influencing a consumer’s subjective value of the product). The contractual
bargain constitutes a risk allocation.
But drawing up contract terms to address all relevant risks is easier said than
done. Markets commonly lead to inefficient outcomes as some participants—
typically one-shot, unsophisticated ones—tend to miscalculate the underlying
risks.17 Repeat and sophisticated players have the opportunity, resources, and
profit incentive to hedge, minimize, properly evaluate, and avoid unwarranted
risks. Open doors can help weaker parties minimize some risks and evaluate
others better.18
In addition, open doors can minimize the risk that relevant preferences will
change in the near future. As a simple example, assume that a consumer
purchases an item and shortly after, receives a similar item as a gift. Her need
for the purchased item usually diminishes. A similar dynamic occurs after a
consumer purchases a warm coat for the upcoming winter, and then learns that
the winter is forecast to be rather mild. The longer period an open door
provides, the more likely it is to help individuals who face changing
circumstances.
Moreover, open door mechanisms help unsophisticated players minimize an
additional risk: that the opposing party will breach the agreement and shirk its
short-term obligations. An open door reassures the consumer, at least to some
extent, that the purchased product or service is not defective and that it will
meet its asserted specifications and descriptions. With an open door mechanism
in place, potential aggrieved consumers can automatically obtain the remedy
they would seek should the product or service be defective. In such a case,
consumers can rescind the transaction at minimal cost, without the need to
litigate their claims.19 Thus, an open door limits the risk that the consumer will
suffer from a breach20 or a defective product.21

17. For a debate on consumers’ ability to learn from experience and minimize risk, see Oren BarGill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Richard A.
Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2008).
18. For a discussion of how return policies can minimize uncertainty in these transactions, see BenShahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 7–8.
19. While the risk of shirking parties might seem minimal in view of the clear course of legal action
that harmed parties may take, things are far from being so simple. For one-shot, unsophisticated
players, access to the legal system is costly and limited. Thus, in many cases (especially given the limited
benefits of such claims), consumers will refrain from initiating legal action.
20. Note, however, that open door mechanisms merely protect consumers’ restitution interest. A
breach might generate greater damages and thus call for the protection of a consumers’ reliance and
expectation interest. To meet this objective, consumers would still have to consider litigation.
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C. Open Doors, Positive Emotions, and Psychological Effects
The reasons noted thus far support open doors from what can be viewed as
an economic perspective. Thus far, this article has dealt with individuals’
preferences. Yet open doors have additional, psychological dimensions as well.
By and large, even when individuals do not anticipate immediate changes in
their preferences or circumstances, they feel much more confident making
decisions once they know the decisions can be easily reversed, with minimal
costs. In western liberal countries, people tend to view such a right as part of
our freedom, which we so greatly cherish. The mere option to cancel decisions,
or at least postpone them, is psychologically reassuring. If we must choose
between making a final decision and making one that can be revoked, we will
most likely opt for the latter—and doing so will give us comfort. Thus, open
door strategies and provisions are not only efficient in the strictly monetary
sense. They also promote emotional well-being on the most basic level: by
enhancing satisfaction.22
D. Open Doors, Competition, and Positive Externalities
Lastly, the phenomenon of open doors can lead to positive externalities by
proving beneficial to competitors. When contracts are “final” and no open door
is available, individuals are “locked” into their initial decision. Once a binding
contract exists, it is quite expensive or difficult for consumers to breach and opt
to contract with a competitor. Usually these “lock-in” effects are enforced by
harsh penalties if contracts are breached midway. Given the high switching costs
consumers might encounter, potential competitors have very limited ability to
compete for consumers who have entered into a binding contract.
By providing consumers with an easy exit option, open door provisions can
enhance efficiency. Open doors enable competitors to pursue potential
consumers even when they are in a contractual relationship with another firm.23
This dynamic lowers entry costs to markets and facilitates competition. As a
result, open doors may encourage variety and quality in consumer markets.
Before proceeding, an important caveat should be inserted. So far, the
assumption has been that the open door mechanism devised in the underlying
contract and the open door put into practice are the same. This is not always the
case. In many instances, the policies formulated in a contractual framework are

21. The specific benefits mentioned here can be also achieved through other legal means, such as
consumer protection laws, class actions, et cetera. See generally Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky,
Consumers’ Right of Withdrawal: A Well-Reasoned Right or a Pyrrhic Victory?, 32 TEL AVIV U. L.
REV. 127 (2010) (in Hebrew).
22. This intuition has been examined and challenged in several psychological experiments. See, e.g.,
GILBERT, supra note 1.
23. This ability has the most relevance in the context of long-term contracts, especially for services.
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far harsher than those applied in practice.24 For various reasons, firms have little
to lose and much to gain from practicing a more lenient approach than is
articulated in the contract.25 However, for clarity, and since these are unstable
and unpredictable outcomes, this article assumes that most firms often exercise
their formal policy as stipulated in the contract.26
III
THE COMMON WISDOM OF OPEN DOORS AND THE LAW
Open doors have various positive attributes. Hence, it might seem natural
that the law adopt the idea of open doors and, perhaps, encourage its usage. As
detailed next, the notions of open door are embedded in the existing legal
framework in three main ways.
In the most drastic and obvious form, open doors are rendered mandatory.
In other instances, the law approves open door policies in more subtle ways,
such as setting them as defaults. Finally, the law can simply uphold open door
provisions in a contractual framework. By allowing the implementation of open
doors, the law further enables market participants to employ open doors.
A. Mandatory Open Doors
The rulebooks provide a variety of instances in which a contractual open
door mechanism is mandated.27 Perhaps the most famous example is that of

24. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857,
858 (2006).
25. See generally Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303 (2008).
Some commentators argue that such strategies are even efficient and preferable in certain
circumstances. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827–28 (2006) (“A seller concerned about its reputation
can be expected to treat consumers better than is required by the letter of the contract.”).
26. A mirroring problem is possible as well: firms might contractually provide open doors that go
beyond those that the sales representative conveys to consumers. For a discussion of instances when
this form of conduct is purposeful and strategic (as a measure to generate price discrimination among
consumers), see David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 133, 155 (2010). Gilo and Porat refer to such practices as relying upon “Selective
Beneficial Terms.” Their example is of a subscription to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), which
provides, in fine print only, for the right to cancel within a certain period of time. This right is not
evident to consumers who do not read the fine print. We refrain from developing this point for the
reasons set forth in the text. Also, we believe that novel ways for distributing consumer information will
prove helpful in closing this information gap. For an analysis of this dynamic, see Becher & Zarsky,
supra note 25.
27. For some reviews of this legal framework, see JOHN A. SPANOGLE, RALPH J. ROHNER, DEE
PRIDGEN & JEFF SOVERN, CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 252–53 (3d ed. 2007); Colin
Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation
for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case of “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1211, 1238 (2003); Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. See also IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW
AND POLICY 141, 330–46, 555 (2d ed. 2007) (United Kingdom); Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21
(Israel).
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mandatory “cooling off” periods.28 These are set by federal29 and state30
legislators and regulators for door-to-door sales, and, in some cases, timesharing sales. In these circumstances, open door mechanisms protect consumers
from falling prey to aggressive sales tactics and undue pressure.31
Mandatory open doors, however, go beyond door-to-door and time-sharing
sales.32 Regulators have set them in place for somewhat risky transactions (and
therefore as an appropriate measure to reassess risk) such as used car sales (socalled lemons laws).33 In addition, they have been set in place for important and
substantial transactions (such as home equity loans),34 where both reassessment
of risk and the additional information gathering by the weaker party might be
essential. In the European Union (EU)35 and other countries,36 extensive
regulatory frameworks provide a “right to rescind” distance sales. These laws
pertain to catalogs and phone orders, and have been broadened to e-commerce
transactions.37 So far, such regulation has not been enacted in the United
States.38
28. For a general background and discussion, see SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 251–59.
29. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1995) (mandating a cooling-off period in door-to-door transactions).
30. According to one study, every state—and the District of Columbia—has enacted a cooling-off
statute. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW app. 14A
(2009).
31. See, e.g., Arizona v. Direct Sellers Ass’n of Ariz., 494 P. 2d 361 (1972) (upholding a statute
regulating door-to-door salesmen, citing a Congressional report that noted “a disproportionate number
of door-to-door sales involve misleading or high pressure sales”).
32. Some loan and financing regulations allow borrowers to refinance or terminate their loan with
minimum costs, at any time. There is heated debate as to how these policies impacted the recent
economic crisis. See Wallison, supra note 3. The law also assures that firms provide consumers with
portability, that is, the ability to switch easily to a different provider. The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (HIPAA) ensures that medical
insurance providers allow the insured to switch jobs by requiring firms to insure against preexisting
conditions. The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) mandates local phone number portability,
which promotes competition in telecommunications markets and limits incumbents’ ability to lock up
their existing customer base.
33. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-b (McKinney 2004). One might argue that these rules
counter “aggressive” tactics of used car salesmen as well.
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1995) (Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667(f)) (provision
mandating a three-day right to rescind home equity loans)); Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-709, 102 Stat. 4725 (amending provisions of the Truth in Lending Act).
35. See Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the
EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 371 (2000);
Borges & Irlenbusch, supra note 16.
36. Australia and New Zealand are two examples. For a report addressing this issue in the Asia–
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region, see Elec. Commerce Steering Grp., Int’l, Approaches
to Consumer Protection Within the APEC Region, NORTH AM. CONSUMER PROJECT ON ELEC.
COMMERCE (Oct. 2002), http://www.nacpec.org/docs/Approaches_to_consumer_protection.pdf.
37. See, e.g., Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 35. One of the rationales for extending such
protection to the Internet in the EU was to promote e-commerce. Some argue that applying this
rationale to the U.S. legal and business setting on its own seems unfitting. Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra
note 5, at 4. For a challenge to the basic premise of this rationale, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21,
at 190–92.
38. For a recent call to extend the current legal setting and add additional default “open door”
rules, see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5.
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B. Legal Frameworks that Promote Open Door Policies
Imposing a mandatory open door regime is a harsh legal intervention in the
market. Setting default rules is a milder measure.39 Defaults are usually set to
meet the common preferences of transacting parties, thus limiting overall
transaction costs. In some instances, defaults take on a different role—one
which strives to encourage the transfer of information among transacting parties
(“penalty default rules”) or affect the transacting parties’ behavior in a manner
the state deems fit.40
In various contractual frameworks, open doors are set as defaults in
accordance with these latter rationales.41 In the realm of retail, several states
have enacted regulation concerning consumers’ right to return goods or the way
vendors should present their return policies.42 Arguably, regulators strive to use
defaults as instruments for promoting the transfer of information on return
policies. Or else, the default is used to encourage the adoption of open doors in
the market.
At other points, the law gives a milder, subtler nod. This occurs in the
context of rolling contracts or online software agreements. Here, courts and
commentators have been debating whether the terms included in a software
package constitute a binding contract. A major impediment to recognizing the
existence of a contractual framework is the lack of actual consent to the terms
by the purchasing party prior to entering and “accepting” the transaction.
A famous court decision, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,43 may illustrate. In this
decision, still considered by many as good law,44 Judge Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit held that a binding contract was formulated when the software
was purchased, in accordance with the terms detailed in the software box. The
court did so, even though the contractual terms could not be viewed prior to
formation. The court found that the ex ante flaw regarding actual assent could
be cured by the purchasers’ ex post ability to view the terms and return the

39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003) (introducing the concept of libertarian paternalism, associating
consumer cooling-off periods with it, and explaining that libertarian paternalism “is a relatively weak
and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced off”).
40. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). See also Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998).
41. In the financial context, policy, at times, actively facilitates open doors. For instance, the
federal government has put in place an elaborate system that enables banks to offer fixed-rate or longterm loans which allow refinancing at any time. In other words, these loans allow the borrower to exit
one loan and opt for another. The government does so at considerable expense. The rise and fall of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are possibly related to these issues. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 4–6.
42. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 218-a (McKinney 2009); Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1723 (Deering 2009).
43. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For a recent analysis revisiting this
case, see Randal C. Picker, Easterbrook on Copyright, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165 (2010).
44. Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 469 (2006).
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product thereafter.45 The existence of the open doors in this context served as a
substitute for one of the most fundamental elements of contract formation: ex
ante consent to the contract and its terms. That is, not only are open door
options useful, they could actually replace one of the most important
components of a binding contract. Interestingly, a somewhat refined but
generally similar notion was accepted most recently in the Principles of
Software Contracts.46
C. Upholding and Reinforcing Open Doors
In many realms of business—retail and wholesale are cornerstone
examples—market participants use open doors voluntarily. Recent studies
indicate the enormous popularity of such practices, which in some instances are
extremely lenient.47 Firms offer these mechanisms for a variety of reasons: to
meet consumer preferences, to signal quality, to promote goodwill, or to engage
in sophisticated marketing.
These instances might seem to be located outside the realm of regulation
and legal intervention. But they are not. This is so because courts uphold
contracted open door rights, with regard to both the existence of the right and
its limits. Additionally, regulators may intervene in these relations, by
mandating additional disclosures or changing the rights and obligations of the
contracting parties.
This perspective may seem trivial and its analysis futile. Why not uphold
contractual obligations that seem to benefit weaker parties in closing
information gaps and assessing risks, as well as having positive psychological
and externality effects? On its face, there is no reason to object to agreements
that allow consumers more time to contemplate their transactions, thus
maximizing their utility and satisfaction. Yet as we now explain, this sunny
outlook of open doors is not always accurate.
IV
THE PROBLEMS OF OPEN DOORS
Open doors lead to very different outcomes from those portrayed in the
previous parts. The intuitions that support open doors are, in many instances,
wrong.48 This misunderstanding leads to a flurry of problems, which at times
override the apparent benefits that open doors present.

45. For a recent analysis, see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5.
46. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (2010). For a
recent discussion, see Hannibal B. Travis, The Principles of the Law of Software Contracts: At Odds
With Copyright, Consumers, and European Law?, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1557 (2010).
47. Examples include, inter alia, Costco, Macy’s, Walmart, and Target. For a sample of these
lenient policies, see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 6–7.
48. Having additional (or “more”) legal rights as opposed to less is, at times, detrimental to society
at large. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than Less: An
Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634 (2008). Lewinsohn-Zamir shows how many existing
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In this context, regulators seem to do too little. Currently, open door
mechanisms are mandated, encouraged, or upheld, with the parties left to their
own devices. Understanding the pitfalls that come with open doors might help
regulators and policy-makers formulate the way the legal approach to open
doors ought to be crafted.
In many instances, open doors lead to negative outcomes for the
unsophisticated contracting party that occur without that party’s understanding
or knowledge.49 First and foremost, firms commonly (and at times subtly) inflate
the transaction costs involved in rescinding a contract in various ways.50 For
instance, firms make sure that contacting the representative in charge of
canceling a service is next to impossible. In other instances, they set strict
demands for physically returning a product. These problems are quite common
and cannot be corrected by competition or consumer complaints given several
persistent market failures.51
Misrepresentations of open doors and imposing undue burdens on
consumers who wish to return a product or cancel a contract, are indeed
problematic. But there are further problems in the open door process that are
currently unrevealed.
A. Are Open Doors Indeed Open? Valuing and Perceiving Open Doors
In many cases, and for many consumers, open doors are not truly open. The
ability to rescind an agreement and exercise an open door might not be as
straightforward as it seemed at the time of formation. To verify this claim, one
should examine the marketing, business, and psychological dynamics involved
in open door mechanisms.

property-related norms strangely limit the autonomy and rights of various players—supposedly
undermining efficiency and fairness. However, her analysis shows that, in light of behavioral insights
and cognitive failings, these rules are, in many cases, optimal. Our premise differs from LewinsohnZamir’s on a central point: rather than explaining the rationale behind existing law and justifying it
based on a behavioral analysis, we use behavioral analysis to demonstrate that current law ought to be
reexamined.
49. For example, regulators intervened in transactions which included open doors that were
apparently misleading or fraudulent. In some cases, signs indicating “Free Trial Period!” and “Money
Back—GUARANTEED!” were, indeed, too good to be true. Some involved “bait and switch”
schemes, where the product provided was not the one advertised. Others misled consumers as to the
difficulty of rescinding the initial transaction. The Federal Trade Commission has taken steps to
regulate “negative option plans” and “free trial offers” involving “book of the month clubs” and other
such settings. See SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 236–37. Regulators moved to assure proper
disclosure prior to the transaction regarding the nature of the open door option, as well as the steps
required to rescind it.
50. Sovern, supra note 4, at 1644. But see Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 16 (indicating that
firms at times “exploit natural barriers” as a measure to limit the consumers’ ability to rescind contracts
for strategic reasons). The use of such implicit barriers, even for achieving this fair outcome, is
troubling.
51. Sovern, supra note 4, at 1667.
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1. Are Open Doors Salient?
A preliminary question is whether parties presented with an open door
factor it into their decision of whether to transact. The analysis here assumes
that often this is indeed the case. It further assumes that parties implicitly
“price” the open door option, and willingly pay for it. To this end, the
distinction between salient and non-salient open door mechanisms should be
explained.
As many standard form contracts include dozens of pages and hundreds of
elements, it is highly unlikely that a contracting party will allocate sufficient
attention to them all.52 A major reason for the existence of an open door is to
assist the consenting party in overcoming the almost impossible task of reading
and understanding all contract terms. It is widely agreed, for example, that
consumers tend not to read form contracts most of the time, and for various
good reasons.53
In light of this reality, contract law scholars distinguish between “salient”
and “non-salient” terms and provisions.54 The salient ones are those that parties
read (or learn of their existence in another way),55 comprehend, and consider.
Non-salient provisions are given less weight or are simply ignored.56
The distinction is significant. According to this line of reasoning, salient
provisions—the most usual examples are price and quantity terms—can
generally be enforced by courts, requiring limited judicial scrutiny. In
competitive markets, parties effectively signal to each other their preferences
and consent insofar that salient attributes are at stake. These instances conform
to the overall notion of the freedom to contract and the autonomy of
contracting parties.

52. A classic economic assertion in this context is that, where strong competition exists, it is enough
that some consumers (a substantial minority) shop for contract terms in order to discipline sellers and
generate a fair and efficient market. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
This thesis has been questioned and criticized from various perspectives. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz &
Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996).
53. See, e.g., Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read
the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts (N.Y.U. Law &
Econ.
Research
Paper
No.
09-40,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256; Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard
Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
199 (2010); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual
Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617 (2009).
54. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA.
L. REV. 118, 170–177 (2007); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003).
55. This flow of information is generated by (usually experienced) consumers in various ways. For
a detailed analysis, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 25.
56. The distinction between these categories is not clear-cut, and a term that is non-salient at the
time of the transaction might become salient at a later time.
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Non-salient elements should be treated differently. If individuals do not pay
attention to some contract provisions, no consent emerges and no signaling
occurs. Thus, the preferences of market participants cannot be incorporated
and reflected in the contractual terms. Rather, in such a case, the contract is a
result of the will of the drafting party and the ignorance of the other. For that
reason, commentators have noted that courts (ex post) and regulators (ex ante)
should intervene to protect ignorant, unsophisticated players from imbalanced,
non-salient provisions.57
One of the fundamental questions in this respect is whether open door
mechanisms are salient. On the one hand, open doors resemble many other
elements that are considered non-salient. Open door provisions pertain to an
uncertain and relatively unpleasant event which might take place in the future
(the dissatisfaction with the product or service purchased). The chances of it
occurring may seem rather slim.58 This places open door provisions among
typically neglected elements such as remedies, forum selection clauses, and
arbitration terms. The potential non-saliency of open doors presents a strong
argument for setting open doors as defaults or through mandatory rules.
On the other hand, open door clauses enjoy some degree of public attention.
For instance, recent surveys indicate that consumers assign considerable
importance to return policies.59 This might be explained given the cultural
significance of this element in U.S. retailing.60 In view of these findings, some
degree of salience of open doors from consumers’ perspective may be
reasonably assumed.
Until robust empirical data is gathered, the analysis should include several
preliminary distinctions. First, open doors have salient and non-salient
elements. Arguably, people often notice their mere existence or absence, and
maybe even the extent of the period they are open for. However, the specific
terms that accompany open doors (for example, requirements such as keeping

57. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer
Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 749 n.2–4 (2009); Korobkin,
supra note 54.
58. There are different perspectives and findings on this issue. For empirical data regarding the low
rate of actual returns (in this study, sixteen percent), see J. Andrew Petersen & V. Kumar, Can Product
Returns Make You Money?, 51 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. No. 3, 85 (2010), available at http://
sloanreview.mit.edu/the-magazine/articles/2010/spring/51316/can-product-returns-make-you-money/.
For somewhat different findings in the electronics and computer realm, see Yeon-Koo Che, Customer
Return Policies for Experience Goods, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 17, 17 (1996) (“As many as 20% of personal
computers sold to home buyers are known to be returned. . . .”).
59. See, e.g., Erika Morphy, Survey: Customers Want Flexible Return Policies (Jan. 8, 2007),
available at http://www.crmbuyer.com/story/55031.html?wlc=1286145522 (seventy-five percent find a
clear and simple return policy to be a highly important attribute); Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5,
at 20 (“Return policy is not the type of fine print term that goes under the radar, hidden from
consumers’ plain sight.”).
60. TUROW, supra note 2. See also Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 20 (“Buyers seek
information about the sellers’ return policies, because most buyers anticipate returns as a non-trivial
contingency.”).
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receipts or original packaging—which lead to “transaction costs”61) might
frequently be beyond the attention span of the average consumer.
Second, firms offering open door mechanisms sometimes take steps to
render them salient or non-salient. In some cases, firms promote the salience of
open door provisions by advertising: explicitly indicating specific transactions as
“free trial periods,” or emphasizing “money back guarantee” or “cancel
anytime” elements.62 In other cases, firms strive to render these elements nonsalient by “burying” references to the actual open door mechanism in their
contracts.63 Clearly, different instances require different analyses.
Third, even if consumers account for the existence of the open door and its
“price,” we must inquire whether they calculate its value correctly. When
addressing options and their pricing in general, the option holder takes into
account the chance that the relevant event will materialize. At the time of an
initial consumer-related transaction, individuals must take into account the
factors addressed in part II: the chance that at a later time, additional
information, added risks, or changes in preferences will render the transaction
undesirable. Also, the option holder should take into account the possibility
that her analysis is wrong—a risk that, in many markets, is quite predictable
(and thus subsequently hedged). Moreover, consumers should furthermore
consider whether the direct or indirect (or perhaps hidden) costs and
requirements involved in exercising the option would render such actions
unfeasible. This is especially important in ordinary consumer markets, which
deal with relatively cheap and simple goods.
These elements make a proper assessment of open door options rather
difficult. People face serious difficulties assessing outcomes of specific events
that have the general traits of open door dynamics. Those difficulties are
aggravated by the problems and phenomena addressed below. And once the
error is predictable and can be induced by the interested party, the problem
becomes worse and might call for more aggressive regulatory measures.
2. Open Doors and the Endowment Effect
The endowment effect is one of the key contributors to the misperception of
open doors. It refers to the additional disproportionate value individuals attach
to assets they possess or own. For instance, in one famous study, students were
randomly assigned mugs. Those who owned the mugs demanded far more
money as sellers than those who were not given mugs were willing to pay as

61. See Sovern, supra note 4.
62. For examples in ISP markets, see SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 237. For an interesting
illustration, see the General Motors (GM) TV ad, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpqr4
_ONew0 (featuring GM CEO Ed Whittaker conspicuously promoting the “60-Day-Money-Back
guarantee”).
63. This might lead to efficient outcomes by allowing firms to discriminate between diligent and
non-diligent consumers. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 26, at 155 (providing insightful, though esoteric
and rare examples).
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buyers.64 In another study, one group of students was assigned mugs, while a
second was assigned Swiss chocolate. After a short while, both groups were
asked whether they would like to replace the assigned item. In both groups, an
overwhelming majority (about ninety percent) preferred staying with the item
they were originally assigned.65
This effect was replicated in a variety of settings, cultures, and participants.66
Studies indicate that such a change in subjective value is significant, attaches
instantaneously, and grows with time.67 The endowment effect is activated as
early as the moment when goods are purchased remotely (online or through a
catalog),68 or even earlier.69 This can lead to overestimation of one’s rights or
assets, which can lead to mistakes.70
The endowment effect generates a force that should not be underestimated.
Yet, it commonly is.71 This leads to a problem: because individuals do not
correctly predict the extent of the endowment effect, they are unable to assess it
accurately.72 As one scholar puts it,
If we are not sure whether or not we should get a new sofa, the guarantee of being
able to change our mind later may push us over the hump so that we end up getting it.
We fail to appreciate how our perspective will shift once we have it at home, and how
we will start viewing the sofa—as ours—and consequently start viewing returning it as
a loss. We might think we are taking it home only to try it out for a few days, but in
fact we are becoming owners of it and are unaware of the emotions the sofa can ignite
73
in us.

64. The phenomenon was first documented by Richard Thaler some thirty years ago. See Richard
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
65. Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79
AM. ECON. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989).
66. But see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap:
the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005) (challenging the robustness of the endowment effect).
67. See, e.g., Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusing on the Forgone: Why Value Can Appear So
Different to Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 360 (2000).
68. Stacy L. Wood, Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence of Return Policy Leniency on
Two-Stage Decision Processes, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 157, 160 (2001).
69. A possible earlier point is when a bidder in an online auction has remained the highest bidder
for an extended period of time. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 135–36 (2008) (stating
that, in these instances, the endowment effect is triggered by “virtual ownership”).
70. For example, the endowment effect can distort litigants’ willingness to settle a case. See
generally Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties To Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside
the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1999).
71. See generally George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105
ECON. J. 929 (1995) (study indicating individuals’ inability to predict the endowment effect). See also
sources cited infra note 73. For applying the concept of the endowment effect to contract law, see, for
example, Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232
(2003).
72. Whether consumers can learn over time about these effects and correct their decision-making
process is a thorny question. As explained below, we are skeptical whether this is indeed possible in this
context.
73. ARIELY, supra note 69, at 137. See also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 734 (1999)
(“Significantly, it has been demonstrated that people are unable to predict the operation of the
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While the strength and breadth of the endowment effect is not always fully
understood by consumers, it is surely appreciated in the world of business and
marketing. Vendors, service providers, and their consultants fully recognize that
“moving” merchandise into the hands of consumers is the way to get the deal
done.74 To do so, they employ various strategies. One of them is providing
consumers with open doors.
Thus, the endowment effect plays a crucial—yet underestimated—role in
the open door dynamic. Individuals who are provided with an open door
misperceive the impact the endowment effect will have on their decision to
ultimately exercise that option.75 Ex ante, consumers assume they will exercise
the open door option should the product (or service) not meet their preferences
as they see them at that time. However, they misperceive the fact that their
chances of exercising the option are substantially lower. The endowment effect
strengthens the consumer’s connection to a possessed product and increases its
value in her eyes. Slightly restated, the consumer assumes her preferences will
remain stable. But she is typically unaware that the transaction itself might
change her preferences. Such a change will undermine her will to exercise the
open doors option. In a way, therefore, open doors give consumers a false sense
of market power. But, they end up perpetuating the inequalities between
contracting parties that they were supposed to minimize.
This argument is challenging philosophically, because it requires a flexible
and layered use of the concept of “consumer preferences.” Consumers are not
coerced into refraining from exercising an open door option, or misled as to its
terms. Furthermore, consumers’ decision to refrain from rescinding the contract
is based on a genuine value they attach to their possession. That is, their
preferences regarding the relevant product might have changed in light of their
ownership, but their decision (not to rescind the contract) reflects their
preferences once they possess the product. In economic terms, this is Pareto
efficient: the transaction moves the product to the hands of the party that values
it the most.
To explain why this seemingly legitimate exercise of preference merits legal
attention (and perhaps even intervention), the notions of first-order and
second-order preferences should be introduced.76 This terminology highlights
the difference between one’s short-term, or current, preferences, and one’s
long-term preferences. That is, the value one assigns to a product (for example,

endowment effect. . . . [C]onsumers will fail to perceive the risks of taking a product home—they will,
in effect, really perceive it as a ‘no risk’ offer.”).
74. Gerald E. Smith & Thomas T. Nagle, Frames of Reference and Buyers’ Perceptions of Price and
Value, 38 CAL. MGMT. REV. 98, 101 (1995). It is generally agreed that sellers are not subject to the
endowment effect with regard to their merchandise.
75. Articulating the exact influence on consumers is yet a challenge due to lack of empirical data.
See Wood, supra note 68, at 158 (“Behavioral investigation of the issue is nonexistent.”).
76. For a discussion of these terms, coined by Harry Frankfurt, in the legal context, see generally
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interferences With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986). See also
Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 243 (1998).
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a new luxury car or an expensive piece of jewelry) at the time he purchases it
(or chooses not to return it) is not always aligned with his long-term life goals
(for example, education, saving, or health care). Therefore, in the examples
presented above, individuals misperceive the change in their first-order
preferences, which may not match their second-order ones—a change they
might regret later.
This analysis still might confront powerful challenges. Not in every case does
a consumer-based transaction potentially involve an internal conflict between
long- and short-term goals. Therefore, a different way to explain the problem
might be needed. This alternative explanation relies on the need to maintain the
consumers’ ability to engage in autonomous decisions, free from external
influences of interested parties. Open doors might undermine such an ability.
The hidden elements of the endowment effect, which open doors bring to
life, conflict with the human preference for autonomous decisions. This is so for
two main reasons. First, individuals are unable to account for the cognitive
failings occurring in the open door context.77 Second, external forces generate
an endowment effect that is powerful enough to manipulate an individual’s
choices, and might be doing so intentionally.78
3. Inertia and the Costs of Exercising Open Doors
Consumers tend to overestimate their chance of exercising open door
options, and their ability to do so. At the time of contract formation, individuals
are unlikely to understand the full implications of later rescinding the contract.
This misunderstanding occurs even when the entire process of applying the
open door option is transparent to consumers.79 In other words, individuals are
not likely to fully comprehend the cost—in time, attention, anxiety, and out-ofpocket expenses—involved in exercising an open door. At the same time,
sophisticated parties understand quite well the true obstacles inherent in using
the open door option.
Individuals tend to overestimate their ability to exercise open door options
because of several cognitive shortcomings. Generally, people are hard pressed
to properly assess risks and actions that transpire in the distant, uncertain
future. They tend to be over-confident and over-optimistic about future
outcomes.80 Their inclination is to employ optimistic narratives about future
77. The question as to whether the law must engage in active debiasing when cognitive failings lead
to errors of judgment is quite complex and calls for legal analysis beyond the scope of this paper. On
this issue, see Avishalom Tor, Whether and When To Debias Through Law, LAW AND BUSINESS
(forthcoming) (in Hebrew, on file with authors), and sources quoted therein.
78. This form of manipulation presents a much easier case for government intervention. See
Sunstein, supra note 76, at 1159. Yet, this intervention does not pertain to all instances of open doors,
as it calls for some level of a sellers’ intent to manipulate consumers.
79. As opposed to instances in which such misunderstanding results from the firm’s withholding
relevant information about this issue at the time of the transaction, providing misleading data, or
providing full data in an incomprehensible manner. See generally Sovern, supra note 4.
80. See generally Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce At the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993).
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deeds and plans: standing in line to return a product, they assume, will take only
a short time; the phone representative will respond to their request relatively
promptly. And all this will take place when the individual has ample free time
to deal with these matters.
Even if individuals properly understand the meaning of exercising an open
door option ex ante, they are likely to err and overestimate their ability and
willingness to actually do so. In most cases, rescinding a contract requires
action. But people tend to maintain the status quo and remain passive, even if
by doing so they fail to maximize utility.81 Even when choosing action, they
often procrastinate and postpone what has to be done.
Procrastination in the open door context acts as a double threat. First, it
might lead to accidentally missing the timeframe in which a transaction can be
rescinded. Second, procrastination will cause individuals to put off a decision to
use an open door as much as possible. By that later point in time, the
endowment effect will contribute to inaction. Thus, procrastination leads to a
higher chance of ignoring an open door option. These considerations are mostly
unapparent to an individual, so they cannot be incorporated into her
calculations and decision.82
4. Open Doors and the (Mis)perception of Happiness83
Open doors serve a basic psychological function. They allow one party to
delay, albeit for a limited period of time, a sometimes painful human activity:
decision-making. Studies indicate that many individuals do not care for certain
experiences of decision-making. It seems that open doors afford individuals a
soothing experience of extra time to make decisions.84

For a discussion of over-optimism in the context of consumer borrowing, see, for example, Oren BarGill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and
Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. REV. 127 (2004). One might ask why firms (and their executives) are not
also overoptimistic in formulating these return policies. The classic response would be that the firms
can easily de-bias such a tendency, relying on extensive experience, empirical data, and expert advice.
81. For an interesting discussion of the status quo bias, people’s preference toward inaction, and
the omission bias, see generally Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Bias, 5 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1992). Current research suggests mechanisms that may at times overcome
this tendency. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Savings, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 (2004).
82. We further assume that it is unlikely that consumers will adopt a “correction mechanism” as a
result of their past experience. For a different opinion on consumers’ ability to learn from experience,
see Epstein, supra note 17, at 811–13.
83. As well-being and happiness are vague and elusive notions, one might wonder whether it is the
role of regulators to directly advance individuals’ well-being and happiness, as opposed to the
customary objectives of maximizing utility. We submit that there is no reason to limit legal analysis of
utility to the narrow meaning of monetary gain. Moreover, as the economic analysis of open doors is
closely aligned with the psychological one, we present the latter as mere corroborative evidence of our
central point concerning the hidden problems of open doors.
84. Although we are not aware of empirical findings on consumers’ perception regarding this point,
this understanding can be inferred from Daniel Gilbert’s lecture. Daniel Gilbert, Address on Happiness
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_gilbert_asks_why_are_we_happy.html.
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Yet, psychology studies show that at the end of the day, open doors prove to
be something very different. Open door provisions may cause people to
depreciate their choices. For example, in one study, participants were happy to
select an item and be allowed to opt out and replace it with another. However,
the option to opt out caused participants to devalue the item they initially
chose.85 At the same time, participants that were not allowed to change their
chosen item increased their preference for that item. Phenomena such as this
can lead to hesitation and doubt, which can lead to stress or dissatisfaction.
In the same study, participants who were not provided with the open door
showed no regret, confusion, or doubt. Quite the contrary: the fact that this
group’s decision was irreversible triggered their “psychological immune
system,”86 which encourages satisfaction with one’s choice. The group that had
to make inescapable decisions liked their items more than the group that was
able to regret its decisions.87
Individuals thus often tend to overestimate the psychological benefits
associated with open doors. They underestimate the anxiety and anguish open
doors might entail. At the same time, people are ignorant about the effect of
the “psychological immune system” and its ability to enhance their satisfaction
with an item they are unable to return. Therefore, individuals tend to err in
evaluating the chances that they will want to use an open door.
B. The Consequences of Misperception
At the ex ante stage, individuals will misperceive the likelihood that they
will make actual usage of an open doors option. They will most probably
assume that the chances of exercising this option are higher than they really are.
Such misperception may lead to several outcomes, which are, at times,
detrimental to the weaker contracting party as well as to society at large.
The first outcome is that misperception of an open door option will lead to
overpaying, which is both unfair and inefficient. The second outcome is that the
misperception might lead to flaws in the weaker party’s perception of other,
broader attributes of the product or service—again, leading to an unfair and
inefficient outcome. The third outcome is that the misperception generates
flaws in the market’s ability to regard an open door option as an accurate
signaling mechanism, an outcome that systematically disfavors weaker parties.
In most cases, only the latter two outcomes warrant concern.
The analysis moves to examine these outcomes, while employing several
distinctions made above. First, it distinguishes the three forms of open door
manifestations in law: mandatory, default, and voluntary. The analysis also
distinguishes open doors of various forms and levels of salience. And, it

85. Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decision and Revisions: The Affective Forecasting of
Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 509–10 (2002).
86. Id. at 504.
87. Id. at 509.
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distinguishes between misperceptions that transpire, perhaps innocently, in the
market, and those that are induced or exacerbated by sophisticated, repeat
players.
1. Misperception and Option Pricing
Open doors, like other options, have a price. They come at a cost to firms,
and have inherent value to purchasers.88 Where possible, firms will strive to roll
such costs over to ex ante consumers (as opposed to rolling the costs ex post to
those making use of the open doors).89 The price will thus be the incremental
rise in the overall price of the transaction as a result of the open door option.
The first potential negative outcome of consumers’ misperception regarding
the actual use of open doors is miscalculation of the value of open doors.
According to this line of thinking, consumers believe that the option is worth
more than it really is. They may overpay for it.
While this analysis is interesting (and calls for further economic modeling),
this article will not pursue this line of thought. The inefficiencies and unfairness
for unsophisticated players in this context are negligible. The “price” of the
option cannot be more than a small fraction of the overall price, and any unfair
increment will not be more than a small fraction of the price. It is questionable
as to whether pursuing such limited inefficiencies through regulation is
worthwhile, especially in markets where strong competition exists.90
In addition, several countering cognitive heuristics might be at play—at
times possibly offsetting each other’s effects.91 For instance, countering the
tendency of unsophisticated players to overvalue an open door option is their
tendency to underestimate the likelihood of exercising that option. This is
because of individuals’ well-reported tendency to be over-optimistic and overconfident. Accordingly, over-optimism might lead unsophisticated players to
underprice these options, thus countering their tendency to overvalue open
doors.
The problem of miscalculation of the value of open doors pertains to all
forms of open door options (mandatory, default, or voluntary). However, it is

88. For an explanation of the costs in terms of depreciation of the product, see Ben-Shahar &
Posner, supra note 5, at 5. For a broader description of other costs and expenses, see generally Becher
& Zarsky, supra note 21.
89. This can be done by employing restacking fees and fines. Firms usually refrain from setting fees
so high that they will clearly impede the perception of the open door. Some scholars note that in
specific instances, fees are appropriate. See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5, at 16.
90. Furthermore, the analysis calls for an extensive set of assumptions, which are not supported by
empirical findings. For instance, we must assume that, not only is the open door option salient in the
eyes of the ex post party, but the incremental rise in the overall costs of the transaction is salient as
well—a questionable notion which would be very difficult to prove empirically.
91. This point is made with caution. At times, cognitive effects that seem to be pointing in opposite
directions, thus offsetting each other, rely on very different cognitive processes. For a critical discussion
of the analysis of countering heuristics, see Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral
Approach to Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237, 275 (2008).
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hard to believe that firms will risk public backlash for such minute gains.92 Such
backlash may transpire if the public learns of these unfair pricing strategies that
take advantage of consumer shortcomings. It is furthermore questionable as to
whether this concern indicates actual manipulation and deliberate deception by
firms.93 But as we explain next, the implications of the misperceptions at play
are far broader.
2. Open Doors and Risk Miscalculation of the Overall Transaction
The misperceptions regarding open door options make a substantial impact
on parties’ perception of the entire transaction. This leads parties to engage in
transactions that are contrary to their long-term, second-order preferences.94
The existence of an open door affects the decision-making process of the
relevant parties. Typically, transacting parties focus their attention and
calculation at the time of contract formation. Here, they should consider both
long- and short-term objectives. However, the existence of an open door allows
a contracting party to split the decision-making process into two stages. The
first takes place at the time of the transaction (T’0). The second occurs later on,
close to the point at which the open door is about to close (T’1). This split in the
decision-making process is perhaps the most crucial outcome of the open
door—and leads to surprising results.
With T’1 in view, a consumer will postpone part of her deliberation process,
and thus pass through T’0 with greater ease. How much of the overall decisionmaking process will the consumer allocate to T’0? In the context of a two-week
return policy, “[i]f the transaction[] costs are less than the value of the
utilization of the good for two weeks, then the maximizing consumer pays for
the good and takes it home.”95 While one can easily argue that the average
consumer is not a fully rational “maximizing” decision-maker, the postponing of
a substantial part of the overall decision-making process to T’1 seems very
plausible. And considering the general tendency to maintain flexibility and
delay irreversible decisions,96 such actions are indeed feasible.97

92. In terms of the limited sums firms can overcharge for such options.
93. As mentioned, it is easier to justify intervention in instances where the consumers’ preferences
might have been manipulated intentionally, as opposed to regulation countering cognitive failure (such
regulation might raise the specter of paternalism). See supra note 78. In addition, competition probably
cannot resolve this issue because firms are aware of the cognitive failures at play and they all have an
incentive to exploit them. Moreover, firms might be reluctant to educate consumers because once
consumers are educated, other firms will follow and switch their policies. This will render the initial
educational efforts worthless. See, e.g., Gilo & Porat, supra note 26.
94. For an explanation of these terms in this context, see supra note 76 and accompanying text. The
second-order preference in this context might be, inter alia, aesthetics, frugality, free will, and freedom
from manipulations.
95. Id.
96. Wood, supra note 68, at 158 (referring to Barbara Kahn, William L. Moore & Rashi Glazer,
Experiments in Constrained Choice, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 96 (1987)).
97. Once again, it is assumed that the existence of the open door option is salient, at least as
regards to taking into account its existence (and not necessarily its price and terms).
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At first glance, the mere splitting of the decision-making process should not
be deemed problematic. However, the (usually subconscious) analysis carried
out at T’0 with regard to splitting the decision-making process is flawed. At T’0,
individuals base their analysis on the assumption of a specific level of costs that
the decision at T’1 will entail. Additionally, the analysis is premised on the
presumption that their short-term, first-order preferences will remain stable and
that the process as a whole will not prove unpleasant. As noted, all three
assumptions are wrong, to the detriment of consumers.
When these factors are taken in account, an open door seems less like a
consumer perk and more like an enticing retail trap. It lures individuals into
transactions with the promise of exit. This promise is not likely to be fulfilled.98
Consumers end up accepting contracts that do not meet their second-order
preferences after wrongfully believing they will have an easy exit. These
dynamics lead to outcomes detrimental not only to consumers (by hindering
their autonomy), but also to the market at large. They yield inefficient
outcomes that distort the market and undermine firms’ incentives—and
ability—to provide better products and services.
To briefly summarize, open doors are problematic because they shift
decisions to T’1. Decisions at T’1 are not necessarily aligned with long-term,
second-order preferences because they are affected by cognitive biases, which
lead to irrational decisions. The lack of such cognitive failings at T’0 is the reason
why we prefer decisions to be made at that juncture. Of course, at T’0, there are
problems as well (such as insufficient information and unclear risks). But,
assuming that providing an open door is a consumer panacea is simply wrong.
The problems associated with the open door dynamic can occur
inadvertently. But, they can also result from a carefully structured manipulative
scheme. Sophisticated players can strive to enhance the salience of specific
elements, such as the existence of an open door option, thus encouraging the
opposing party to split their decision-making process.99 This can be done
through advertising that clearly emphasizes the benefits of open doors while
leaving out the low rate of their use, as well as by utilizing the hidden effects of
endowment and procrastination.
It is, of course, difficult to establish whether firms deliberately engage in
such manipulative practices. However, when an opportunity to manipulate
arises, and incentives to do so exist, there is a very high chance that
manipulation will indeed occur.100 When consumers’ miscalculations result from
such manipulation, the case for intervention and regulation is easier to make.101

98. ARIELY, supra note 73, at 137.
99. See sources cited supra note 62.
100. Hanson & Kyser, supra note 73, at 743 (“Manufacturers will respond to market incentives by
manipulating consumer perceptions in whatever manner maximizes profits.”).
101. Once again, the vigilant reader might wonder whether the cognitive failures relied on here do
not cancel out or mitigate each other. On one hand, individuals do not grasp the need for exercising the
open door option (which might lead to underestimating such an occurrence and the value of this
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Keeping the specter of manipulation in mind is of great importance when
structuring the relationship between open doors and the law.102
Finally, it deserves emphasis that consumers differ in their attitude towards
risk. Likewise, the behavioral and cognitive failing (or “trap”—depending on
the seller’s intent) does not pertain equally to all consumers. Some savvy
consumers will learn to adapt to new market strategies. Others will learn about
the seductive pull of open door mechanisms from peers and contacts. Some will
do even better, by benefiting from the additional time to contemplate
transactions. Yet other consumers will use open doors to “borrow” products at
no fee.
The existence of these different groups, however, does not undermine the
argument set out here. Some individuals might be immune to the lure of open
doors. Yet for less sophisticated consumers, lenient open door options are
powerful tools that convince them to engage in transactions that may not suit
their long-term, second-order preferences, and are inefficient overall.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of consumers “escaping” the problems of
open doors probably exacerbates those problems. Abuse and misuse of open
door options generate additional costs to firms. Firms providing open doors will
strive to roll these costs over to less sophisticated consumers, thus generating a
problematic cross-subsidy among these groups.103 These issues increase the need
to examine the legal protection of less sophisticated segments of consumers.
3. Open Doors as an Inaccurate Signaling Mechanism
Another way to understand open door options is as “signaling mechanisms.”
An open door assures buyers that the firm is willing to rescind the contract and
incur associated costs.104 By doing so, the firm signals that it is confident that
buyers will rarely experience dissatisfaction and exercise their open door
option.105 Slightly restated, vendors can express their confidence that their
product will basically meet buyers’ expectations by offering open doors.
Signaling can play out in several ways. First and foremost, it can occur by
the mere offering of open door provisions (as opposed to not offering any). It

contractual right). On the other hand, they overestimate its value. We do not find these elements
aligned so we do not believe that they cancel each other out. True, the benefits of open doors might be
discounted at T0. Yet, the benefits that are recognized lead to the splitting of the decision-making
process, and pushing part of it into the future—where cognitive fallacies come alive. Additional
research is still required to resolve this point.
102. Hopefully, future work will establish whether applying mandatory or default open doors can
impact the problem of deliberate manipulation.
103. Cf. Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005)
(opining that the solutions and suggestions associated with libertarian paternalism will often improve
the welfare of irrational persons at the expense of the rational ones).
104. As explained above, in many cases, at least some of the costs are rolled over to the other party.
Yet it is not necessarily known or salient to the average consumer at the time of contract formation. In
addition, in competitive markets, a consumer’s intuition that at least some of the costs will be borne by
the seller is mostly correct.
105. Wood, supra note 68, at 159.
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could be manifest in the features of open doors: the extended time period for
rescinding the original contract, the limited transaction costs associated with
rescinding the contract (“Hassle Free!”), et cetera. This form of signaling is
added to the great variety of other signals coming from parties in the
marketplace, such as price, brand, and reputation.
Accepting an open door as a signaling mechanism calls for several
assumptions discussed above regarding its salience. First, we must assume that
consumers understand that exercising an open door mechanism entails costs, so
firms adopting such provisions signal quality. For such signaling to occur, the ex
ante weaker party (usually the consumer) must take into account the existence
of the open door option at the time of transacting. For other—more detailed—
elements of this signal (period, cost, et cetera), we must assume that the parties
account for, recall, and even compare various facets of the available open door
options in the market. This latter assumption is quite weak; therefore, assuming
this form of fine signaling is incorrect.
In view of the previous analysis, it becomes clear that the signaling
mechanism at play is flawed. The analysis shows that firms’ exposure to
expenses related to an open door is substantially less than the typical consumer
might assume.106 In fact, the signal a firm sends out by employing an open door
is not backed by the firm’s or the product’s actual performance. Thus, the
consumer will engage in the transaction or overpay for the product because of
an inaccurate signal. What makes this issue exceptional and complicated is that
the firm’s presentation is factually true. That is, the firm is indeed willing to
replace the product or rescind the transaction at the consumer’s will. Yet firms
might still mislead, given consumers’ lack of understanding of their own
behavior.
As in other areas of the law, a possible response to consumers’
misunderstanding as to the true meaning of signals is information disclosure.
Accordingly, legislatures might require sellers to disclose information regarding
the extent of actual returns. By making such information available, consumers
will learn that the open door is hardly a signal for quality.
However, such disclosures can backfire. Providing consumers with
information about the limited number of returns might exacerbate the signaling
distortion. Consumers might wrongfully interpret the low rate of returns as a
signal of satisfaction, whereas the complete picture is much more complicated.
Thus, this problem calls for a more nuanced response.
While open doors clearly function as signals when they are voluntary (and
especially when rendered salient by advertising), it is a more complicated issue
with regard to mandatory and default open doors. Seemingly, the enactment of

106. This is aside from the fact that costs are, in part, borne by the buyers from the very beginning.
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mandatory open doors neutralizes all signaling. In a mandatory regime, an open
door is not the result of a firm’s goodwill but of a governmental mandate.107
One might argue that even in this setting, firms can signal their use of open
doors by providing terms that go beyond the regulatory mandate. But this
would be a costly venture. It would also probably be unnoticed by the average
consumer, for whom such contractual elements are non-salient. Thus, a
mandatory open door policy is a partial solution to the signaling problems.
However, it comes at the high price of market inefficiency and harm to
autonomy.108
Default open door mechanisms set by law raise additional questions, which
call for further examination. For instance, one interesting question is whether
consumers would view adhering to a default government standard as a sign of a
firm’s goodwill.109 At first glance, it seems that setting defaults (if these are wellknown to the public) will indeed weaken the signaling force of lenient open
doors adopted by firms. This is an additional element that policy-makers ought
to consider.
V
CONCLUSION: THE PATH TO NEW PERSPECTIVES ON OPEN DOORS
Open doors have positive attributes. Their existence is rooted in the
American culture. Consumers appreciate open doors, and are willing to pay a
premium for them. At the same time, firms are willing to provide open doors.
Modern commerce proves that open doors are sometimes a necessary tool to
enhance market activity and guarantee a minimal standard of fairness.
Yet, open doors lead to intricate consequences. Some of which are
detrimental and manipulative to the weaker party, who is typically not aware of
the open door’s inner workings. Legislatures cannot assume that open doors are
a simple “one-size-fits-all” solution to thorny problems. Consumers are
heterogeneous. They differ in their decision-making processes, risk preferences,
and degrees of rationality. Therefore, the legal response to open doors presents
an intriguing analytical question, which is made more acute by the very
different approaches taken on either side of the Atlantic.

107. One might indeed argue that the analysis assumes that the public is aware of the mandatory
element in the open door policy. Whether this is true or not is for empirical testing to decide. However,
this issue could be resolved by increasing education on existing and future mandatory open doors to
limit this problem. It could also be resolved by forbidding vendors to present open doors as voluntary
when they are mandatory.
108. See generally Becher and Zarsky, supra note 21; Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5. This is
clearly an issue that requires additional research. Additionally, a mandatory regime will prevent
consumers from learning from experience and mistakes.
109. Cf. Borges & Irlenbusch, supra note 16, at 99 (hypothesizing that “a statutory entitlement
might weaken the adoption of fairness considerations in the decision-making process,” and that “a shift
from a voluntarily granted withdrawal right to a statutory one indeed seems to . . . encourage[]
[consumers] to seek their own benefit [and exercise their withdrawal right]”).
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As U.S. vendors continue to voluntarily offer extremely lenient return
polices, EU (and elsewhere) regulators are pushing to expand mandatory return
polices in many markets.110 One way or another, regulators are missing crucial
elements that are an inevitable part of the open door dynamic. Some of these
behavioral, cognitive, and economic elements have been addressed in this
article.
Society is constantly striving to achieve a balance. It aims to maintain fair
markets and consumer autonomy on one hand, yet allows marketers to
innovate and exercise their autonomy on the other. Whereas many forms of
marketing that take advantage of cognitive failings are considered “fair play,”111
it looks as if the current balance is inappropriate and flawed.
Society should deal with the complexities facing consumers one at a time. In
every context, we ought to establish which forms of conduct are acceptable—
that is, do not generate extensive market failures or impose impediments on
individual autonomy—and which forms go too far. This article made the first
step, unraveling the hidden sides of open door provisions.
Further policy recommendations in the context of open doors require
additional studies, some of which were outlined throughout this article. One
prominent example is the question of whether open doors are salient. It is
important to examine which elements of open doors consumers account for,
and which they ignore. Another important issue is the endowment effect, which
plays a crucial role in our analysis. While economists and psychologists are
extremely interested in this effect, our analysis calls for refined experiments that
will take into account various products and elements of open door provisions.
In addition, studies must address inertia and procrastination trends, and
differentiate between various markets and products, as well as groups of
consumers. Regulators will face difficult decisions as to which groups should
receive preferential treatment at every juncture.
When mapping out this market-specific response to open doors, two
additional challenges are worth mentioning. First is the challenge of identifying
and dealing with markets where the existence of open doors is especially
beneficial, given the risks and the information gaps that consumers face.112
Second is the need to take into account the costs that open door options
generate to both firms and consumers. Such costs include depreciation,113 but

110. See supra notes 35–36; Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21 (noting mandatory cooling-off period in
consumer transactions in Israel); SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 27, at 253 (noting that “cooling-off
periods have been widely adopted in Europe for a wide variety of consumer transactions”).
111. Indeed, consumer markets are filled with aggressive, suggestive, and manipulative marketing
techniques. Merely having a handsome model promote a product constitutes a manipulation. “Two for
the price of one!” is another marketing scheme that abuses cognitive failings. In these (and other)
cases, consumers are left to their own devices, and must learn on their own (at times with the help of
peers, elders, or market forces) how to interpret the surfeit of information that markets provide.
112. For a discussion of such specific markets, see generally Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21; BenShahar & Posner, supra note 5. One example is the market for home electronic appliances.
113. Depreciation is the dominant element considered by Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 5.

BECHER & ZARSKY

90

2/15/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:63

also operational costs, missed transactions because of return-policy abuse, as
well as plain theft.114 These varied costs will sometimes point regulators in
opposite directions.
Finally, academics and regulators should explore novel solutions that could
allow some consumers to enjoy the benefits of open doors while protecting
others from their enticements.115 This article is merely a modest step. The
seemingly simple story of open doors opens many interesting doors to intriguing
questions of human behavior, markets, policy, and law.

114. Open doors enable some forms of theft. See generally Becher & Zarsky, supra note 21.
115. Cf. Camerer et al., supra note 27.

